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Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An
Analysis of 206 Case Outcomes in the United
States from 1994 to 2012
Blaine Bookey*
I. INTRODUCTION
At age fourteen, Ms. N, a Salvadoran national, met her boyfriend, who
was five years her senior. After Ms. N moved in with him, the abuse and
controlling behavior started including physical violence as well as
emotional abuse and threats. Her boyfriend prevented Ms. N from leaving
the house and having contact with relatives and friends. After Ms. N gave
birth to their son, the abuse worsened. Her boyfriend beat her with his
fists, his feet, and his belt. Ms. N’s grandmother attempted to intervene to
no avail, including seeking help from the Salvadoran judicial system. Her
attempts produced only threats on her life from Ms. N’s boyfriend and his
family. On one occasion, Ms. N felt so desperate and alone, she tried to
commit suicide. She feared reporting the abuse to the police, because she
knew stories of other women who had tried to report abuse—instead of
receiving help, they faced retaliation from their abusers. After enduring
two years of horrific violence and intimidation, Ms. N left El Salvador in
2010 to save her life.1
After Ms. P, a native of Kenya, gave birth to their third son, her
husband began to control all aspects of her life, forcing her to quit her job
and inflicting severe and routine physical and sexual abuse. He beat her in
public and at home, leaving scars and, on at least one occasion, permanent
injuries. When Ms. P’s husband became involved with another woman, the
beatings intensified, and he infected Ms. P with syphilis and gonorrhea.
The medication Ms. P took to cure the infections caused a miscarriage of
their fourth child. Ms. P’s husband also threatened to kill her. When Ms. P
went to her parents’ town, her husband came looking for her. Although the

* Staff Attorney, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies (CGRS), and Adjunct
Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The author thanks Karen
Musalo and Lisa Frydman for their contributions and guidance. Tilman Jacobs and Molly
Franck, also deserve credit for their tracking and analysis included this article as do Julia
Epstein and Brianna Krong for their editorial assistance.
1. CGRS Database Case #7571 (2012). All CGRS database case numbers referenced
throughout the article are on file with the Center.
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police became involved on more than one occasion during her marriage,
they did little to protect Ms. P. Finally, Ms. P made the heart-wrenching
decision to leave her children in the care of her brother, and she fled Kenya
in desperation.2
These two women came to the United States in search of protection
that their own governments had failed to provide. Only one was successful
in her quest. The key difference rested on the immigration judges (IJ)
assigned to hear these claims. In both cases, the judges agreed that the
women testified credibly, that the harm they suffered rose to the level of
persecution, and that their governments had failed to protect them.3 But
while the judge in Ms. N’s case found that the abuse she suffered was
inflicted on account of her membership in a particular social group (PSG)
of “Salvadoran women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,”
a group defined by her gender, nationality, and status in a domestic
relationship, the judge in Ms. P’s case did not believe that there was a
relationship between the abuse she suffered and any protected ground,
finding that a group defined by gender, nationality, and status in a domestic
relationship is not cognizable under the law.4 Ms. N received a grant of
asylum, but Ms. P’s case is currently pending before the U.S. Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA or the Board), which has yet to provide
guidance to the lower courts for how to handle asylum cases involving
domestic violence (DV). Similar facts thus yield very different outcomes
for asylum seekers.
In 2003, the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies (CGRS or the
Center) at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law
published an article examining the state of gender asylum claims in the
United States.5 In that article, CGRS analyzed forty-five decisions by
immigration judges and the BIA in gender asylum cases, including twentytwo cases involving women who fled domestic violence. The analysis

2. CGRS Database Case #8491 (2011).
3. This article assumes that the reader has some familiarity with basic asylum principles
related to gender claims. For a more robust overview of the law and development of gender
claims in the United States, see Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the
United States: Resistance and Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards
Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 46 (2010) [hereinafter “Musalo, A
Short History of Gender Asylum”].
4. To qualify for asylum an applicant must satisfy the immigration statute’s definition of
a “refugee”—a person who is unwilling or unable to return to her home country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
5. See Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Asylum for Victims of Gender Violence: An
Overview of the Law, and an Analysis of 45 Unpublished Decisions, 2003 IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS 1 (2003) [hereinafter “Musalo & Knight, Asylum for Victims of Gender
Violence”]. Gender asylum is used to describe claims for protection of asylum and
withholding of removal in which the feared harm is gender-specific or disproportionately
impacts women and/or the reason the harm is imposed (that is, nexus) is related to or “on
account of” gender.
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demonstrated that a number of adjudicators viewed developments in the
United States—namely the issuance of proposed regulations on genderbased asylum6 and the vacatur of the BIA’s precedential decision denying
asylum to a domestic violence survivor in Matter of R-A-7—as removing
obstacles to granting relief in gender asylum cases. However, other
adjudicators continued to perceive R-A-, despite vacatur, as posing
obstacles to granting asylum protection to women fleeing a broad range of
gender-based harms. Given these inconsistent outcomes, adjudicators
clearly needed additional guidance from the government and the courts, in
particular with respect to the treatment of domestic violence asylum claims.
Despite positive developments over the last decade, the disparity in the
treatment of Ms. N and Ms. P shows the continued and urgent need for
guidance.
The proposed gender regulations have not been issued in their final
form,8 and no BIA or U.S. Federal Court of Appeals decision has squarely
held that domestic violence is (or is not) a basis for asylum in the United
States. Nevertheless, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
taken the position in the landmark Matter of R-A- case, as well as a similar,
highly publicized asylum case known as Matter of L-R- that women who
have suffered domestic violence may establish eligibility for asylum and
withholding of removal based on, inter alia, membership in a PSG. The
granting of asylum to the women in R-A- and L-R- by stipulation of the
parties in 2009 and 2010, respectively, has opened doors for other women.
Still, the absence of applicable jurisprudential or regulatory norms and
shifting policy positions by DHS on a case-by-case basis has led to
contradictory and arbitrary outcomes.9
Disparities in asylum adjudication in the United States have been well
documented.10 However, exposing failures in the administrative system
has had minimal impact on creating accountability, in part due to the
continued lack of transparency in decision making. IJ decisions as well as
Asylum Office (AO) and many BIA decisions are not published or

6. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (proposed Dec. 7,
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) [hereinafter “Proposed Regulations”].
7. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999).
8. The Obama Administration indicated its intention to issue the proposed regulations in
2010, but this never happened. The Regulatory Plan, 74 Fed. Reg. 64137, 64220-21 (Dec.
7, 2009) [hereinafter “The Regulatory Plan”].
9. The government itself has noted that the piecemeal approach taken so far in gender
cases “has resulted in inconsistent and confusing standards.” Id. at 64221.
10. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM:
SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND
JUDGES 7 (2008) (analyzing more than 198,000 asylum decisions rendered by immigration
judges in from Oct. 1, 1994 through Apr. 30, 2007) [hereinafter “GAO, U.S. ASYLUM
SYSTEM”]; Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60
STAN. L. REV. 295, 296 (2007) (analyzing more than 400,000 decisions from all levels of the
asylum adjudication process in the United States).
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available in any publicly searchable database.11 This lack of transparency
and accountability extends to the actions of DHS attorneys across the
country who present arguments to IJs and the Board in domestic violence
asylum cases that are at times inconsistent with the agency’s position in RA- and L-R-. This deficit of information is particularly pronounced in the
domestic violence context, because IJ and BIA decisions have received
scant review by the Courts of Appeals—the result of a decade-long halt on
the adjudication of domestic violence claims at the lower levels—whose
decisions are publicly available.
This article analyzes 206 outcomes12 in domestic violence asylum cases
before the immigration courts and the Board dating from December 1994 to
May 2012 in order to shed light on decision-making trends and provide
greater transparency to the asylum system. Part II provides the
methodology and Part III provides the findings and analysis. The analysis
focuses on how PSGs based on domestic violence are formulated and
treated, grouping adjudications collected by CGRS into time periods
marked by significant events in the Matter of R-A- and L-R- cases. This
analysis clearly demonstrates that whereas some immigration judges have
begun to accept asylum claims involving domestic violence in light of
developments in R-A-, L-R-, and related cases, the absence of binding
norms remains a major impediment to fair and consistent outcomes for
women who fear return to countries where they confront unimaginable
harms, or worse, death. Without clear guidance, the United States will
continue to shirk its international obligations to protect women who present
bona fide claims for relief.

II. METHODOLOGY
A. COLLECTION OF CASE OUTCOMES BY CGRS
CGRS maintains an extensive database with information on more than
6,000 gender-based, child, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) asylum claims. Attorneys provide the information to the Center
with the consent of their clients. Some or all of the following information
is contained in individual case records in the Center’s database: country of
origin; key facts; type of persecution; applicable bars to asylum or
withholding; legal theory; evidence or experts used in the case; procedural
history and posture of the case, including the jurisdiction and assigned IJ;
and rationale for the decision to grant or deny relief. In addition to the

11. See Sydenham B. Alexander, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration
Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2006).
12. This article includes analysis of 206 outcomes, but only 198 distinct cases. This is
the result of some cases having had multiple decisions rendered during the time periods
studied. The Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- cases are not included in the total.
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information included in the individual case records, CGRS also keeps on
file unpublished IJ or BIA decisions in hundreds of cases. The database
contains written opinions for 118 of the 206 case outcomes analyzed for
this article. The information for eighty-eight case outcomes derives from
notes, briefs, and other documents submitted to the immigration courts that
the attorneys shared with CGRS.
The Center collects this information through its Technical Assistance
Program, which provides attorneys who request assistance from CGRS
with legal consultation, expert affidavits, and country conditions
documentation. After providing assistance, CGRS maintains contact with
attorneys to learn about developments and outcomes in their cases. The
Center also collects information from attorneys who do not seek assistance
but otherwise learn that CGRS tracks this type of information, as well as
through the Center’s involvement in some cases as counsel of record or
amicus counsel.13 The information collected in the database is unique and
unavailable from any other source. Numerous researchers have used the
CGRS database to analyze trends in asylum adjudication across the country
in a variety of areas.14
B. SCOPE OF SAMPLE CASE OUTCOMES IN THE CGRS DATABASE
For present purposes, the definition of domestic violence-based asylum
claims has been limited to those predicated on relief sought from “intimate
partner” violence. Therefore, the analysis excluded cases in the database
coded as “domestic violence” that involve claims of child abuse, threats of
forced marriage, or sale into human trafficking by family members other
than an intimate partner. Similarly excluded were cases that involve other
types of persecution on account of gender, such as female genital cutting
(FGC), where no other intimate partner violence was present. All of the
cases analyzed involve male aggressors and female victims.15

13. Attorneys can submit requests for assistance or amicus support by visiting the CGRS
website, available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/assistance/.
14. See, e.g., Kim Thuy Seelinger, Forced Marriage and Asylum: Perceiving the
Invisible Harm, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 55 (2010) (analyzing unpublished decisions
in asylum cases involving forced marriage); Lisa Frydman & Kim Seelinger, Kasinga’s
Protection Undermined? Recent Developments in Female Genital Cutting Jurisprudence, 18
BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL.1073 (2008) (analyzing treatment of asylum claims involving
female genital cutting); Karen Musalo & Marcelle Rice, The Implementation of the OneYear Bar to Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 693 (2008) (analyzing decisions
regarding application of the one-year bar to asylum); Musalo & Knight, Asylum for Victims
of Gender Violence, supra note 5 (analyzing the treatment of gender asylum claims
generally). See also Sarah Rogerson, Waiting for Alvarado: How Administrative Delay
Harms Victims of Gender-Based Violence Seeking Asylum, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1811 (2009)
(analyzing impact of proposed gender regulations on decision making from 2001-2009 in
gender asylum cases based in large part on outcomes published by CGRS).
15. This is not to say there are no male victims of domestic violence or that domestic
violence does not occur in same-sex relationships, but rather merely reflects the case
information collected by CGRS and analyzed in this article.
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Moreover, information in the database regarding case outcomes at the
Asylum Office has not been included, because the AO does not provide
extensive legal analysis, which impedes the Center’s ability to track how
developments in the law have affected asylum officer adjudications.16
C. ORGANIZATION OF CGRS DATABASE CASE OUTCOMES FOR ANALYSIS
The cases chosen for analysis were grouped chronologically by the date
of the IJ or BIA decision, in order to analyze how adjudicators responded
to external events. Seven distinct time periods were identified using
important markers in the evolution of domestic violence asylum claims in
the U.S. The chosen markers track developments in the Matter of R-A- and
Matter of L-R- cases. Understanding the analysis of case outcomes requires
basic knowledge of the developments in domestic violence asylum, and of
these two cases specifically. A brief overview is provided here.
1. Prior to June 11, 1999: pre-Matter of R-APrior to the BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A-, issued on June 11, 1999,
no precedent decisions by the BIA or the Courts of Appeals, nor binding
regulatory guidance existed regarding domestic violence as a basis for
asylum. In 1995, the United States issued gender guidelines that provided
examples of gendered harms that could constitute persecution, including
domestic violence, but the guidelines did not bind IJs, the BIA, or the
Courts of Appeals.17 In addition, although the Board broke new ground in
gender-related claims in a decision the following year, Matter of Kasinga,18
granting asylum to a Togolese woman who fled her country to escape
female genital cutting, the decision was not directly on point in domestic
violence cases.19 The Kasinga decision was (and remains), important to the
domestic violence context because it applied the BIA’s seminal social
group decision, Matter of Acosta,20 holding that a social group is defined by
characteristics that are immutable or fundamental, to hold that an applicant

16. As of July 5, 2012, CGRS had on file 287 grants and 129 denials in DV asylum cases
from Asylum Offices across the country over the last seventeen years.
17. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Considerations for Asylum
Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women (May 26, 1995), published in 72, No.
22 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771, 771 (June 1995).
18. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996).
19. The BIA’s Kasinga decision overcame interpretive barriers that often stand in the
way of relief in gender-based asylum claims. For example, it found FGC to be persecution,
notwithstanding the fact that it is a widely condoned cultural practice. It recognized that
social groups could be defined in reference to gender and it did so in a case involving nonstate actors—namely the family and community that sought to impose genital cutting. In
addition, the BIA had no difficulty finding a nexus between the persecution and social group
membership by taking the societal context into consideration.
20. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).

Winter 2013]

DV AS A BASIS FOR ASYLUM

113

can establish membership in a PSG defined by gender in combination with
other characteristics.21
2. June 12, 1999 –January 19, 2001: BIA issued a precedential
opinion on domestic violence asylum in Matter of R-AIn the BIA’s precedent-setting domestic violence asylum decision,
Matter of R-A-, delivered June 11, 1999, the Board held that the horrific
abuse suffered by the applicant, Ms. Rody Alvarado, constituted
persecution, but concluded that it was not inflicted by her husband on
account of her membership in a PSG or any other protected ground. The
BIA rejected the social group formulation accepted by the IJ, “Guatemalan
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions who believe that women are to live under male domination,”
because even if joined by immutable or fundamental characteristics in line
with Acosta, it said, the group was not “recognized and understood to be a
societal faction.”22 The BIA also rejected the relevance of societal context
in determining nexus between the harm and Ms. Alvarado’s group
membership.23 The Board’s PSG and nexus analyses in R-A- thus stood in
contrast to its prior Acosta and Kasinga decisions, confusing the
jurisprudence.24 In addition, the Board found that Ms. Alvarado did not
establish that her husband’s behavior was motivated by her actual or
imputed political opinion. During this period, the BIA issued another
notable precedential domestic violence decision in Matter of S-A-.25
However, S-A- involved parental, not spousal, abuse and was based on
religion, not PSG.
21. The particular social group was defined in Kasinga as “[y]oung women of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had [female genital mutilation], as practiced by the
tribe, and who oppose the practice.”
22. This language regarding the recognition of a group as a societal faction was the
forerunner to the BIA’s ruling that not all groups that share an immutable or fundamental
characteristic are cognizable. In addition to the Acosta factors, the BIA has since required
that “social visibility” and “particularity” of the groups be established.
23. The Board’s approach was out of step with the recommendations of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that societal context is relevant in
determining the motivation for persecution. Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum,
supra note 3, at 56.
24. In December 2000, while the R-A- decision was in effect, the Department of Justice
issued proposed regulations to promote uniform interpretation of gender asylum claims that
include a substantial amount of guidance favorable to claims based on domestic violence.
The preamble states that the regulation serves to remove “certain barriers that the In re R-Adecision seems to pose” to domestic violence claims, that gender is an immutable
characteristic, and that marital status may be considered immutable in appropriate
circumstances. Proposed Regulations, supra note 6. The proposed regulations also firmly
establish Acosta as the standard for PSGs. However, the regulations were not finalized
during this period, so were not binding on IJs or the BIA.
25. Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000) (holding that father persecuted
daughter on account of her liberal Muslim beliefs concerning the proper role of women in
Moroccan society).
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3. January 20, 2001 – February 19, 2004: Matter of R-A- vacated by
the U.S. Attorney General with no further guidance provided
The Board’s 1999 decision in Matter of R-A- provoked a firestorm of
criticism. Sustained pressure from various constituencies across the
country, including several members of the U.S. Congress, led then U.S.
Attorney General (AG) Janet Reno to become directly involved in the case
in a process that allows the AG to “certify” a case to herself for a
decision.26 After she accorded herself jurisdiction over the case, on
January 19, 2001, AG Reno vacated the BIA’s R-A- decision and remanded
it to the Board to decide at such time as the proposed gender regulations
became final. Therefore, after January 19, 2001, R-A- no longer bound
immigration judges or the Board. However, AG Reno’s remand order
hamstrung the BIA from issuing a new decision in R-A- until the proposed
gender regulations became final (which has yet to occur). Adjudicators at
the lower levels were again left without clear guidance regarding the
treatment of domestic violence asylum cases.27
4. February 20, 2004 – September 25, 2008: DHS announced its
position in DV asylum cases in Matter of R-A-, at that time pending
at the Board
On February 19, 2004, DHS submitted a brief to AG John Ashcroft,
who had recertified the Matter of R-A- case to his authority. Notable was
the fact that DHS reversed course from its previous position and argued
that Ms. Alvarado had established eligibility for asylum on account of her
membership in a PSG.28 DHS defined the social group as “married women
in Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship.”29 Of particular
importance, DHS affirmed the BIA’s seminal Acosta decision as the
touchstone for defining social groups. Using Acosta as the framework,
DHS argued that gender is immutable and that marital status may be
immutable or fundamental where factors make it so, for example, “if a
woman could not reasonably be expected to divorce because of religious,
cultural or legal constraints, or because evidence indicates that her husband
would not recognize a divorce or separation as ending the relationship.”30
DHS further argued that a group need not “be small in order to qualify as a

26. In the United States, the Attorney General has the authority to certify cases to him- or
herself for decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i). Any decision issued by the AG is
binding on the BIA and immigration courts in every jurisdiction where there is no
contravening federal court of appeals decision.
27. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 6.
28. DHS’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief, Matter of R-A-, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005) (A 73 753 922), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/
legal/dhs_brief_ra.pdf [hereinafter “DHS R-A- Br.”].
29. Id. at 15.
30. Id. at 20.
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particular social group.”31 The brief also addressed nexus in domestic
violence cases in a manner that incorporated circumstantial evidence of the
societal context in which the violence occurs. In addition, DHS disavowed
as “fundamentally flawed” the Board’s finding in R-A- that lack of
evidence that Ms. Alvarado’s husband sought to harm other group
members indicated that he was not motivated by group membership.32
Rather than rule on the case, AG Ashcroft sent it back to the BIA and
imposed a stay. The BIA was again ordered to refrain from reconsidering
the case until the proposed regulations were in final form. This fourth time
period includes cases decided after DHS set forth its framework for
domestic violence cases in the R-A- brief until the Executive took further
action in R-A- in 2008.33
5. September 26, 2008 – July 16, 2009: AG lifted the stay in Matter
of R-AOn September 25, 2008, AG Michael Mukasey lifted the stay imposed
on the BIA and remanded Matter of R-A- for immediate reconsideration of
the issues presented with respect to asylum claims based on domestic
violence notwithstanding that regulations had yet to be finalized. This next
time period includes cases decided after AG Mukasey’s order until DHS
clarified its position in domestic violence cases the following year.
Although no new precedent was issued, this period was significant because
many women were left in legal limbo while the prior AG stay orders had
been in effect.34 After the stay was lifted, the Board remanded some
domestic violence cases, including R-A-, to the immigration court and
requested supplemental briefing in other cases in light of the BIA’s
imposition of “social visibility” and “particularity” into the PSG analysis.35

31. DHS R-A- Br. at 22.
32. Id. at 32. Circumstantial evidence of the persecutor’s motive to harm his partner on
account of her status in the relationship could include “evidence that such patterns of
violence are (1) supported by the legal system or social norms in the country in question,
and (2) reflect a prevalent belief within society, or within relevant segments of society, that
cannot be deduced simply by evidence of random acts within that society.” Id. at 36.
33. Id. at 36; DHS’s Supplemental Brief, Matter of L-R- (BIA Apr. 13, 2009),
available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief%20on%20PSG.pdf
[hereinafter “DHS L-R- Br.”].
34. While the stay was in effect, asylum offices sent DV asylum cases to headquarters in
Washington. D.C., immigration judges administratively closed the cases or continued them
indefinitely, and the BIA sat on appeals for years, waiting for direction. See Lisa Frydman,
Recent Developments in Domestic-Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 2009 LEXISNEXIS
EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS 4075 (2009) [hereinafter “Frydman, Recent Developments”].
35. The new requirements were imposed by the BIA in 2006 during the protracted battle
in R-A-. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006), aff’d Castillo-Arias v. Att’y
Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006). Social visibility requires that the members of the
group be visible to the society at large, while particularity requires that the group be clearly
defined with concise boundaries. Not all courts of appeals have accepted these
requirements. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting BIA’s
requirement of social visibility and remanding for consideration of social group claim);
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The Board did not issue a precedential decision in R-A- or in any of the
other cases to guide the lower courts.
6. July 17, 2009 – December 10, 2009: DHS updated its position in
DV cases in Matter of L-RWhile R-A- was pending on remand before the immigration judge,
DHS filed a supplemental brief to the BIA in the related Matter of L-Rcase. The brief became public on July 16, 2009.36 The agency’s approach
in its supplemental brief in L-R-, a case involving a Mexican woman who
fled more than two decades of atrocious abuse at the hands of her commonlaw husband, builds on the position it articulated in its R-A- brief.
Together, the briefs set forth DHS’s official position regarding domestic
violence claims. The significant difference between the 2004 and 2009
briefs is that the latter includes the agency’s position on how the BIA’s new
social group requirements of “social visibility” and “particularity” can be
met in such cases. Specific to the asylum seeker in L-R-, DHS advanced
two formulations of a social group that it argued could meet the
immutability, visibility, and particularity requirements, depending on the
facts in the record: (1) Mexican women in domestic relationships who are
unable to leave; or (2) Mexican women who are viewed as property by
virtue of their position in a domestic relationship.37 The brief also noted
that, in appropriate cases, the social group can be based on family. DHS
explained that social visibility refers to the fact that society (including
government) perceives the defined group in a certain way and accords
group members different treatment on that basis, which can be shown by
prevailing laws, application of laws including impunity for violations, and
broad societal attitudes.38 With respect to particularity, DHS explained that
the group must be defined with sufficient specificity to delimit
membership, and that characteristics of the group, such as a “domestic
relationship,” are susceptible to clear definition.39 The BIA heeded DHS’s
request to remand L-R- to the immigration judge for additional fact-finding
but, as in R-A-, it did so without issuing a precedential opinion clarifying
the doctrine. In addition to L-R-, the Board started remanding other DV
asylum cases to the immigration courts for record development as a matter
of course.

Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011) (declining to defer to
the BIA’s requirements of social visibility and particularity and affording the BIA the
opportunity to provide a reasoned explanation as to their meaning on remand); HenriquezRivas v. Holder, 449 F. App’x 626 (9th Cir. 2011), rehearing en banc ordered by 670 F.3d
1033 (9th Cir. 2012) (at the time of writing, reconsidering the issue en banc).
36. DHS L-R- Br., supra note 33, at 23.
37. Id. at 14.
38. Id. at 17–18.
39. Id. at 19.
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7. December 11, 2009 – present: asylum was granted by the IJ in
Matter of R-AOn December 10, 2009, an immigration judge in San Francisco finally
granted asylum to Ms. Alvarado. Although the IJ’s order was less than a
sentence long and had no precedential value,40 the victory had great
symbolic significance. The case had become the battleground on which the
issue of domestic violence as a basis of asylum had been fought for more
than a decade, and the case in which DHS first set forth a framework for
asylum eligibility in domestic violence cases. The final group of cases
analyzed includes IJ and BIA decisions issued since the R-A- grant; the
most recent decision was rendered on May17, 2012. While several women
fleeing domestic violence have experienced victories in the wake of R-A-,
including the applicant in L-R-,41 the Board still has not issued a
precedential decision on the viability of domestic violence asylum, and the
Executive has yet to finalize regulations.
D. LIMITATIONS OF ANALYSIS OF CGRS DATABASE CASES
No official statistics exist regarding the number of asylum cases
adjudicated in the United States that involve domestic violence as a basis
for protection.42 Therefore, it is impossible to know if the information in
the CGRS database provides a representative sample. Consequently, the
analysis does not provide any statistical analysis or draw any conclusions
regarding probable outcomes. Moreover, the sample outcomes originate
primarily from attorneys who contacted CGRS for assistance, and thus do
not represent random case outcomes. The dataset, however, represents a
diversity of jurisdictions across the country, with cases concentrated in
states with high levels of migration: California, Florida, New York, and
Texas.43 IJs located in those four states heard 111 of the 206 cases, or

40. The IJ’s decision stated: “Inasmuch as there is no binding authority on the legal
issues raised in this case, I conclude that I can conscientiously accept what is essentially the
agreement of the parties [to grant asylum].” CGRS Database Case #59 (2009).
41. Like the decision in R-A-, the IJ decision in L-R- may be symbolic, but it too holds no
precedential value. The IJ’s summary order simply states that asylum is granted and
includes a notation that it was a result of “stipulation of the parties.” CGRS Database Case
#5363 (2010).
42. In Fiscal Year 2008, more than 47,000 claims for asylum were adjudicated in
removal proceedings (a figure that does not include claims by individuals not in removal
proceedings, which are processed by the Secretary of Homeland Security). See OFFICE OF
PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 2008 ASYLUM STATISTICS (2009). The statistics are divided by
country only, however, and there are no statistics available regarding the number of gender
claims advanced in proceedings, let alone statistics regarding the number of claims that
involve domestic violence.
43. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) of the U.S. Department of
Justice operates immigration courts in fifty-nine cities in twenty-nine states. See Dep’t of
Justice, EOIR Immigration Court Listing, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm
(last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
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about fifty-four percent. San Francisco (forty-five cases), New York City
(eighteen), and San Antonio (fourteen) produced the largest representation
in the data sample (see Table 1 below).44 Other jurisdictions produced
between one and twelve outcomes over the studied time period.45
TABLE 1: GRANT RATES BY IMMIGRATION COURTS FOR COURTS WITH
AT LEAST FIVE DECISIONS IN THE CGRS DATABASE
JURISDICTION
San Francisco, California
New York, New York
San Antonio, Texas
Miami, Florida
Seattle, Washington
Arlington, Virginia
Los Angeles, California
Baltimore, Maryland
San Diego, California
Boston, Massachusetts
Chicago, Illinois

TOTAL
GRANTS
35
13
10
6
7
7
3
8
4
6
2

TOTAL
DENIALS
10
5
4
5
3
1
5
1
3
1
3

TOTAL
DECISIONS
45
18
14
11
10
8
8
9
7
7
5

The CGRS database drew domestic violence asylum outcomes from
117 different immigration judges across the country. The sample includes
multiple decisions from thirty-three different IJs, both male and female (see
Table 2 below), which allowed for an analysis of the individual
adjudicator’s response to the external events over time. Where the sample
produced only one decision from a particular IJ, by contrast, it was not
possible to track that particular judge’s decision making over time.

44. These courts are among the courts that receive the highest volume of asylum cases
generally. See GAO, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM, supra note 10.
45. The cities where the cases recorded in the CGRS database were heard include the
following in alphabetical order: Anchorage, Alaska (1 case outcome); Arlington, Virginia
(8); Atlanta, Georgia (1); Baltimore, Maryland (7); Bloomington, Minnesota (3); Boston,
Massachusetts (7); Bradenton, Florida (1); Charlotte, North Carolina (1); Chicago, Illinois
(5); Dallas, Texas (1); Denver, Colorado (4); El Paso, Texas (3); Elizabeth, New Jersey (4);
Eloy, Arizona (1); Harlingen, Texas (1); Hartford, Connecticut (3); Houston, Texas (3);
Kansas City, Missouri (1); Los Angeles, California (8); Memphis, Tennessee (2); Miami,
Florida (12); Newark, New Jersey (2); Oakdale, Louisiana (1); Omaha, Nebraska (2);
Orlando, Florida (1); Portland, Oregon (4); Puerto Rico (1); San Antonio, Texas (14); San
Diego, California (6); Seattle, Washington (10); Tacoma, Washington (2); Tucson, Arizona
(1); York, Pennsylvania (5). The precise jurisdiction is unknown for four cases for which
CGRS does not have written decisions on file.
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TABLE 2: GRANT RATES BY GENDER OF ADJUDICATOR FOR
CASES IN THE CGRS DATABASE

GENDER OF
IJ
Male
Female
Unknown

TOTAL GRANTS TOTAL
DENIALS
66 (63.5%)
38 (36.5%)
55 (73%)
20 (27%)
16
2

TOTAL DECISIONS
BY GENDER
104
75
18

Some case reports in the CGRS database remain incomplete; in some
instances, for example, the database indicates that an appeal was filed with
the BIA or the Courts of Appeals, but CGRS has not been able to track the
case’s ultimate resolution.46 In other instances, it is possible that an appeal
was filed, but CGRS was not made privy to this information. In any event,
lack of complete information concerning appeals and final outcomes does
not affect the analysis of the correlation between external events and
decision making.
Finally, the CGRS dataset of domestic violence asylum cases is skewed
towards positive outcomes precisely because CGRS learns of these cases
from attorneys—thus, these cases concern asylum seekers who had legal
representation, and whose legal counsel sought expert assistance. The
dataset includes 126 grants of asylum, ten grants of withholding of
removal, and four grants of relief under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT), or sixty-eight percent positive outcomes. By comparison, there are
only sixty-three recorded denials of any form of relief, representing thirtyone percent of the sample. This approximate ratio of 2.2 grants for every
denial probably does not accurately reflect the success of domestic
violence-based asylum claims nationwide. It more likely shows a stronger
desire or willingness from attorneys to report positive rather than negative
outcomes. And attorneys who request technical assistance from CGRS
may have a higher rate of success than those who do not; certainly this
success rate is higher than the rate for asylum seekers who do not have
legal representation.

III. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW OF CGRS DATABASE CASE OUTCOMES ANALYZED
This article analyzes 206 outcomes in domestic violence asylum cases
decided in the United States between December 1994 and May 2012. The

46. CGRS attempts to track outcomes periodically by following up with attorneys, but
attorneys change firms or leave the profession, and it can be difficult to track down a final
outcome for some cases.
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sample includes 140 grants of relief and sixty-three denials (see Figure 1
below). The sample also includes three grants of motions to reopen (MTR)
to apply for asylum on the basis of DV. Immigration judges issued the
majority of the decisions; only eight of the decisions came from the BIA.47

The following legal rationales form the basis of the grants of asylum or
withholding of removal:
 Particular social group based on domestic violence (DV-PSG)
 DV-PSG + political opinion (PO) or imputed political opinion
(IPO) based on resistance to domestic violence (DV-PO)
 DV-PO only
 PSG based on other factors (such as FGC)
 Religion only

47. As explained earlier, the BIA held domestic violence asylum cases from the time that
Matter of R-A- was vacated in 2001 until AG Mukasey lifted the stay in 2008. After the
stay was lifted, the Board remanded many cases that had been on appeal, so these cases are
only now returning to the Board for adjudication. CGRS knows of several domestic
violence asylum cases pending at the Board.
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The majority, 118 out of 136, of the grants of asylum and withholding
were based on the domestic violence related rationales (DV-PSG, DV-PSG
+ DV-PO, or DV-PO) (see Figure 2 below).

The most common reasons given for denial were the lack of a
cognizable social group or the failure to demonstrate nexus to a protected
ground (see Table 3 below).48 In any given decision, a judge may have
presented several alternative bases for denial, so the following numbers
reflect the frequency of the alternative bases in the sixty-three rejected
cases. They do not reflect separate decisions, and therefore they total a
number greater than sixty-three. In addition to lack of PSG or nexus (fifty
decisions), denials were also most frequently based on:
 Failure to show the government’s inability or unwillingness to
protect (nineteen)
 Lack of credibility or sufficient evidence (eleven)
 Lack of political opinion (fifteen)
 Internal relocation alternative (six)
 No well-founded fear of future persecution (five)
 Failure to establish membership in a PSG, assuming arguendo
a PSG exists (four)
 Lack of religion (one)
Notably, many of the judges who denied relief had no trouble finding
that the harm the applicants suffered—often involving severe physical,

48. IJs often conflated the PSG (cognizability) and the nexus (motive of persecutor)
inquiries; for example, the decision to reject a proffered DV-PSG was often expressed as the
failure to establish nexus to a protected ground.
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sexual, and psychological violence—constituted persecution, or even that
the fear of future harm was well-founded.49
The women in these cases hail from countries around the world. But
most of the domestic violence cases in the CGRS database involve women
fleeing from countries in Latin America (136 cases), in particular,
Guatemala (thirty-two cases), Honduras (twenty-nine), Mexico (twentythree), and El Salvador (twenty-three).50 No distinct patterns emerge with
respect to the applicant’s country of origin and the case outcome.
B. CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TREATMENT OF DV ASYLUM
CLAIMS IN UNPUBLISHED AGENCY DECISIONS: THE INFLUENCE OF
EXTERNAL EVENTS
The formulation and treatment of domestic violence asylum claims that
advance a PSG as the principal basis for relief provides the focus for this
analysis. PSG is the stated rationale in most of the grants and lack of PSG
the stated fatal flaw in most of the denials captured by the CGRS database.
An analysis with this focus, therefore, can highlight the types of PSGs
accepted and rejected by adjudicators as well as identify other trends in
legal reasoning in relation to developments in domestic violence asylum
law and asylum law more generally in the United States, using particular
time periods (see Table 3 below).

49. See, e.g., CGRS Database Cases #8002 (2007); #8491 (2011).
50. Other countries of origin include the following:
 Africa (twenty-nine total): Cameroon (5); Congo (1); Gambia (3); Ghana (2); Guinea
(5); Ivory Coast (1); Kenya (3); Liberia (1); Mali (1); Nigeria (2); Sierra Leone
(1); Uganda (3); and Zimbabwe (1).
 Asia (eighteen total): Bangladesh (4); Cambodia (1); India (3); Indonesia (2);
Malaysia (1); and Mongolia (7).
 Europe (sixteen total): Albania (1); Armenia (2); Croatia (1); France (1); Lithuania
(1); Moldova (1); Poland (1); Slovenia (1); Spain (1); Turkey (1); and Ukraine (5).
 Middle East (six total): Egypt (1); Jordan (4); and Lebanon (1).
 Latin America and the Caribbean (136 total): Barbados (1); Bolivia (1); Brazil (2);
Costa Rica (1); Dominican Republic (6); Ecuador (2); El Salvador (23);
Guatemala (32); Haiti (1); Honduras (29); Mexico (23); Nicaragua (10); Panama
(1); and Peru (4).
This distribution of cases does not purport to paint an accurate picture of the prevalence of
domestic violence globally, but rather reflects the number of cases that appear in the CGRS
database.
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TABLE 3: CASE OUTCOMES FROM THE CGRS DATABASE
(DECEMBER 1994- MAY 2012)
TIME
PERIOD/
RESULT

1: PreR-A-

2: R-Ain
Effect

3: R-AVacated

4:
DHS
Brief
in
R-A-

5: AG
lifted
stay in
R-A-

6:
DHS
Brief
in
L-R-

7:
PostR-Agrant

TOTAL: BY
RATIONALE

Granted:
DVPSG/DV
-PO
Granted:
Other
Denied:
PSG or
Nexus
Denied:
Other
TOTAL:
BY TIME
PERIOD

8

5

27

34

1

4

38

117

2

2

3

9

0

3

4

23

0

5

18

11

2

4

13

53

0

0

4

5

0

1

0

10

10

12

52

59

3

12

55

203

51

1. Prior to June 11, 1999: CGRS database case outcomes decided
before the BIA’s decision in Matter of R-AThe CGRS database recorded ten grants (nine asylum and one
withholding) in domestic violence cases during the time period prior to the
Board’s decision in Matter of R-A-.52 CGRS recorded no denials during
this period. All of the claims in the CGRS database prior to June 11, 1999,
reflect persecution on account of DV-PSG or DV-PSG + DV-PO. The fact
that the social group in Kasinga included the applicant’s opinion about
female genital cutting and resistance to gender norms seemed to influence
judges during this period, as several of the PSGs deemed cognizable for
domestic violence applicants after Kasinga mirrored this formulation.
Gender, nationality, other characteristics related to the applicant’s status in
a domestic relationship, and feminist opinion generally defined the social
groups.53 The IJs recognized political opinions that also related to the
51. The three decisions granting motions to reopen did not involve an analysis of the
merits of the underlying claim for relief and these decisions are therefore not included in
this table.
52. The CGRS database produced written decisions for eight of the cases.
53. Accepted PSGs during this period include:
 Guatemalan women who are or have been affiliated with men who believe it is their
right to dominate “their women” by force or violence. CGRS Database Case #35
(1996).
 Jordanian women who espouse western values and who are unwilling to live their
lives at the mercy of their husbands, their society, and their government and/or
women who are challenging the traditions of Jordanian society and government.
CGRS Database Case #42 (1994).
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PSGs, such as a woman’s opposition and resistance to gender norms. In
one case, the IJ concluded that the PSG and the PO were “interchangeable”
because the applicant challenged traditions in the society and it was
precisely because of her views that she was “beaten to achieve her
submission into the society’s mores” and that she “should not be required
to dispose of her beliefs.”54
The written opinions in the CGRS database from this time provide
detailed legal reasoning. In support of their holdings, the IJs cite most
frequently to the 1995 guidelines, the BIA’s decision in Kasinga, and
decisions from the Courts of Appeals recognizing family-based and genderbased persecution,55 including Fatin v. INS, recognizing that gender is a
characteristic that can link the members of a PSG, and that women or
women who refuse to conform to the government’s gender-specific laws
and social norms are cognizable groups,56 and Lazo-Majano v. INS, holding
that flight from abuser constituted an assertion of political opinion.57
Noteworthy from this period is the degree to which judges looked to
opinions from their colleagues as persuasive precedent in light of a lack of
other binding precedent or guidance. Judges looked to the opinions of
fellow IJs both within the same court as well as across jurisdictions. For
example, the first recorded domestic violence case available in the CGRS
database comes from a judge in Arlington, Virginia, granting asylum to a
woman from Jordan in December 1994.58 Predating the issuance of gender
guidelines and the BIA’s opinion in Kasinga, the opinion includes robust
analysis of the cognizability of a gender-related social group under Acosta
and Fatin. The same judge also issued a positive opinion the following
year tracking the same legal analysis in a case involving a woman from
Sierra Leone.59 In 1998, a Boston-based IJ cited to his Arlington
colleague’s analysis in the Jordanian and Sierra Leonean cases as

 Fartalen (without anyone to protect her rights, or orphan) Malinke women who refuse
to conform to gender-specific societal norms. CGRS Database Case #58 (1998).
 Young, Westernized, Muslim wives in Bangladesh with a feminist political opinion
and women of Bangladesh who have been victims of spousal abuse, especially by
spouses who were in significant positions with the government of that particular
country. CGRS Database Case #373 (1996).
 Guatemalan women who are intimately involved with a male companion who
believes that women are to live under male domination. CGRS Database Case
#59; Matter of R-A- (1996).
 Ghanaian women who have been intimate with men who believe it is their right to
practice force or violence on their female companions. CGRS Database Case #47
(1997).
54. CGRS Database Case #42 (1994).
55. CGRS Database Cases #42 (1994); #41 (1995); #845 (1995); #59 (1996); #373
(1996); #35 (1996); #47 (1997); #58 (1998).
56. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240-41 (3d Cir. 1993).
57. Lato-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
58. CGRS Database Case #42 (1994).
59. CGRS Database Case #41(1995).
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persuasive authority and granted relief to a Guinean woman on similar
grounds.60 The CGRS database also includes opinions from this period
authored by three different San Francisco immigration court judges setting
forth virtually identical PSG frameworks and analyses.61
One judge expressed the sentiment of many during this period: “The
dearth of case law available to me in reaching . . . a decision regarding this
particular situation is certainly problematic.”62 The lack of precedent on
point, while frustrating, may have boded well for asylum seekers at this
time, because IJs were forced to grapple with relevant existing precedent
that was generally positive towards the asylum seeker.
2. June 12, 1999 – January 19, 2001: CGRS database case outcomes
after the BIA issues a precedential opinion on DV asylum in
Matter of R-AThe CGRS database recorded twelve outcomes during this period (five
denials and seven grants). In all of the written opinions recorded in the
database,63 denials and grants alike, the judges acknowledge as binding the
Board’s decision in Matter of R-A-. But the IJs reached different results in
applying this precedent.
a. Denials
With respect to the denials, four of the five opinions cited the
applicant’s failure to proffer a cognizable social group as the basis for the
denial.64 The judges determined that the Board’s decision foreclosed a
domestic violence asylum claim because it was not fundamentally different
from the claim presented in R-A-.65 As one IJ stated, “this Court finds the
abuse suffered by the Respondent to be deplorable beyond words.
However, Congress, in its wisdom, has not deigned to make abusive
personal relationships, no matter how disturbing, one of the grounds upon
which asylum may be granted.”66

60. CGRS Database Case #58 (1998).
61. CGRS Database Cases #35 (1996); #59 (1996); #47 (1997).
62. CGRS Database Case #845 (1995).
63. Written decisions were on file for seven of the twelve cases (four denials and three
grants).
64. CGRS Database Cases #132 (1999); #313(1999); #491 (2000); #3487 (2000). The
fifth case was denied on evidentiary grounds: the IJ held the applicant failed to establish that
her husband harmed her because of her political opinion and failed to demonstrate wellfounded fear because she had returned to Guatemala to visit her children on more than one
occasion. The applicant also advanced a PSG argument, but the IJ’s treatment of this claim
is not clear from the database information. CGRS Database Case #3413 (2000).
65. CGRS Database Cases #132 (1999); #3487 (2000).
66. CGRS Database Case #132 (1999).
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b. Grants
Notwithstanding the Board’s opinion in R-A-, however, six asylum
seekers received grants of asylum in domestic violence cases during this
period. The outcomes were based on DV-PO (two cases), DV-PSG + DVPO (two), DV-PSG (one), and religion (one). In one case where CGRS has
a written opinion, the judge rejected the Board’s PSG analysis in R-A- and
held that the group “Mexican women married to and domestically abused
by Mexican public officials or those charged with protecting the public”
was cognizable.67 The IJ reached this conclusion by determining that the
BIA’s decision in Matter of S-A-68 (holding that the father persecuted the
daughter on account of her liberal Muslim beliefs concerning the proper
role of women in Moroccan society) conflicted with the Board’s nexus
analysis in R-A- and therefore controlled because it was later in time.69 In
another case, the IJ followed the Board with respect to its PSG analysis in
R-A-, but granted on the basis of political opinion by distinguishing the
cases on the facts. The judge distinguished from the PO analysis in R-A-,
reasoning that, unlike Ms. Alvarado, the applicant established that her
boyfriend beat her in response to her assertions of independence,
establishing an imputed political opinion motive for the persecution.70
The CGRS database also includes one grant of CAT relief in a
domestic violence case while R-A- was in effect. In that case, the
applicant’s husband was a high-ranking military official in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.71 The IJ originally denied asylum, rejecting the
PSG “Congolese women who are abused by their spouses in a society that
condones DV” as well as the domestic violence-related political opinion.
The BIA affirmed, but later granted the applicant’s motion to reopen to
apply for Convention relief. On remand, the IJ held that the abuse she had
suffered rose to the level of torture—her husband raped her and infected
her with a sexually transmitted disease, broke and knocked out her teeth,
and caused several other injuries during beatings—and held that her
husband had been “cloaked” with immunity by the government. Of note,

67. CGRS Database Case #494 (2000).
68. Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000).
69. The IJ reasoned that if the Board’s reasoning in its R-A- decision—that the husband
beat her because she was his wife, not on account of social group—had been applied to the
facts in S-A-, “the respondent in [S-A-] would have been denied relief because it is just as
logical to argue that her father abused her because she was his daughter as it was that he did
so on account of her religious beliefs.” CGRS Database Case #494 (2000).
70. The immigration service appealed to the BIA in that case assailing the applicant’s
credibility and challenging the IJ’s conclusion that the Guatemalan government was unable
or unwilling to protect her. The BIA dismissed the service’s appeal finding “no error in the
Immigration Judge’s grant of asylum.” CGRS Database Case #503 (1999).
71. CGRS Database Case #117 (2000).
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the Board thereafter dismissed the immigration service’s appeal and
affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.72
3. January 20, 2001 – February 19, 2004: CGRS database case
outcomes decided after Matter of R-A- was vacated
After AG Reno vacated the BIA’s decision in R-A-, the CGRS database
recorded significantly more case outcomes: twenty-two denials and thirty
grants.73
a. Denials
In contrast to the decisions issued between 1999 and 2001, the
decisions denying relief in domestic violence cases on file with CGRS
during this period largely lack legal analysis and fail to recognize the
significance of the action taken by the AG in Matter of R-A-.74 The most
frequently cited reasons for denials issued during this period were lack of a
cognizable social group (twelve occurrences), failure to demonstrate nexus
(seven), no political opinion (seven), and no showing of government
inability or unwillingness to protect (six).
Some judges who denied relief did so with very little reasoning, simply
stating that they do not believe domestic violence is a basis for asylum.
One IJ merely listed the general elements asylum applicants must show and
then, without further explanation, concluded that “the Court does not find
that the respondent has met the burden of showing that the problem that she
faces would be one of the five reasons given in the Act [sic].”75 Similarly,

72. CGRS Database Case #117 (2000).
73. Written opinions were on file for the majority of the cases (thirty-eight out of the
fifty-two).
74. Groups rejected during this period included:
 Women from [country X]. CGRS Database Cases #1114 (2001) (Albania); #1290
(2003) (Honduras).
 Women in an abusive relationship. CGRS Database Case #1274 (2002).
 Women opposed to male dominance. CGRS Database Case #818 (2002).
 Women from Guinea who have been abused by their husband and oppose such
practice. CGRS Database Case #713 (2002).
 Women who are violently abused by their partners; and women who would not
submit to their partner’s control. CGRS Database Case #889 (2002).
 Mexican women and children who experience domestic violence. CGRS Database
Case #1223 (2004).
 Women married to Guatemalan men with powerful connections in the government.
CGRS Database Case #1195 (2003).
 Women who have cohabitated and share a child with powerfully connected members
of drug cartels in Mexico; and battered female in Mexico who is not protected in
that country. CGRS Database Case #3191 (2003).
75. CGRS Database Case #723 (2001); see also CGRS Database Case #3346 (2003)
(holding the applicant did not establish the violence she suffered was on account of her
membership in a PSG because “[i]t looks like the violence [the applicant] suffered was on
account of the fact that her husband was an abusive individual who was an alcoholic and for
whatever reasons that only God knows he was abusive of her and violent with her and other
people”).
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without citing any case law or providing any clear reasoning, a judge held
that, although the applicant “may have been in an abusive relationship” in
Mexico, “this does not constitute one of the five previously enumerated
grounds on which relief may be granted.”76 Another IJ took note of the
existence of proposed regulations on point, but then rejected them with
little basis, holding:
domestic violence is private in nature and is not the type of
politically motivated harm entitled to international protection
under the Refugee Law. While the United States has recognized
the possibility that women such as the respondent [a Honduran
woman whose partner raped and battered her severely, infecting
her with HIV], could be refugees, it has not granted refugee status
to such women in any currently valid published opinion or
decision.77
The IJ could have turned to analogous case law (such as Kasinga,
Acosta, or Fatin), as some judges had done prior to the BIA’s 1999
decision in R-A-, but instead cited only to the absence of precedent directly
on point. In another case, the judge correctly cited to Kasinga as relevant
authority for evaluating a claim based on a gender-related social group.
But the IJ denied asylum, baldly stating that “[i]t is the opinion of the Court
that the respondent has failed to meet the criteria set forth by the [BIA] to
be qualified for relief in this regard.”78
Where more rigorous legal analysis appears in denying relief, judges
demonstrate an erroneous understanding of precedent or ignorance of the
law to the detriment of the asylum seeker. For example, one judge
incorrectly reads the BIA’s decision in R-A- as briefly establishing “an
opportunity for domestic violence to be a viable claim” before it was
vacated. As such, the IJ concludes that, since R-A- is no longer binding,
domestic violence “is no longer a basis upon which a claim can lie.”79 The
opposite is in fact true: R-A- briefly established a period when the viability
of DV claims was called into doubt, but that negative decision had been
vacated, leaving a void for how to treat these cases. In another case, an IJ
found that the Board’s reasoning in R-A- still held persuasive authority,
despite vacatur, because the proposed regulations of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) “closely examine” the R-A- opinion and “incorporate the
Board’s considerations as factors that may be relevant in some cases.”80
This IJ, however, failed to mention or consider that the stated purpose of
the DOJ’s proposed rule was precisely to overcome the barriers posed by
R-A- to granting relief in DV cases.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

CGRS Database Case #1274 (2001).
CGRS Database Case #1290 (2003).
CGRS Database Case #1114 (2001).
CGRS Database Case #1258 (2003).
CGRS Database Case #818 (2002).
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To reject gender-defined social groups, some immigration judges relied
on the Second Circuit’s opinion in Gomez v. INS, which states that
“[p]ossession of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender
will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a particular social
group.”81 In so doing, the IJs chose the most restrictive reading of
Gomez.82 Moreover, these IJs cited to Gomez with no discussion of the
developments in R-A- or the proposed gender regulations that are more on
point in DV cases, even if nonbinding.83
Other judges looked to a 1975 Board opinion, Matter of Pierre,84
affirming denial of withholding to Haitian woman who feared persecution
at the hands of her husband, to support their rejection of domestic violence
claims as persecution based on personal motives.85 Although Pierre is
relevant to other domestic violence claims because it involves intimate
partner violence, IJs looked to this opinion to the exclusion of intervening
developments in gender-asylum and asylum law more generally, most
notably the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act and the Acosta and Kasinga
decisions. Moreover, judges glossed over a significant distinguishing
factor from Pierre. In Pierre, the Board found that the applicant did not
establish that she would be persecuted on account of race, religion, political
opinion or membership in a particular social group and that the applicant
presented no evidence that the Haitian government “would not intervene to
prevent or punish” her husband’s acts.86 In contrast, the applicants in the
cases recorded in the CGRS database proffer PSGs defined by nationality,
gender, and marital status consistent with Acosta and Kasinga.
A more reasoned denial from this period involved a woman from
Jordan.87 The IJ recognized that both the BIA’s opinion in R-A- and the

81. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
82. The sweeping pronouncement in Gomez about gender-defined PSGs has been viewed
as dicta and criticized for departing from Acosta without appropriate deference to the
agency as required under principles of U.S. administrative law. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440
F.3d 62, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds; see also Koudriachova v.
Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2007) (“we have recently clarified that the best
reading of Gomez is one that is consistent with Acosta”); Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 69, 75 n.7 (BIA 2007) (recognizing that the Second Circuit has distanced itself
from Gomez and affirmed Acosta). An IJ based in a jurisdiction outside of the Second
Circuit similarly relied on Gomez to foreclose all PSGs defined by broad characteristics
such as age and gender. CGRS Database Case #1074 (2004). Gomez is now properly read
as having to do more with the likelihood of persecution than the cognizability of the social
group at issue. See Koudriachova, 490 F.3d at 262.
83. A New York immigration judge relied on Gomez to reject a social group defined in
part by gender, “women violently abused by partners.” The IJ also took issue with the
circularity of the proffered social group, in that it was in part defined by the harm suffered,
and concluded that the harm was “interpersonal, and, although lamentable, not cognizable
under principles of asylum law.” CGRS Database Case #889 (2002).
84. Matter of Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461 (BIA 1975).
85. CGRS Database Cases #1223 (2003); #1279 (2003).
86. Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 462.
87. CGRS Database Case #1271 (2002).
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Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, holding that family
could constitute a cognizable social group,88 had been vacated, leaving a
void of applicable standards in domestic violence cases. To fill the void,
the IJ looked to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rodas-Mendoza v. INS,89
holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that rape was
an isolated, random act of violence “untethered” to the government.90 In
another case, a judge rejected as circular the applicant’s PSG—defined by
the IJ as “women in Nicaragua who are considered chattels by their
husbands and ex-husbands and subjugated”—because it was defined in part
by the persecution.91
b. Grants
By contrast, the IJs who granted relief during this period employed
sophisticated analyses of existing precedent and secondary authorities to
recognize domestic violence-related social groups and political opinions.
The majority of the grants, twenty-four out of thirty, rested on DV-PSG or
DV-PSG + DV-PO.92 Judges generally looked to some combination of the

88. Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001).
89. Rodas-Mendoza v. INS, 246 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2001).
90. Significantly, this IJ has later granted relief in DV cases. See CGRS Database Cases
#2487 (2004); #3064 (2005); #5369 (2008).
91. The IJ also rejected political opinion reasoning that the applicant’s political
opinion—a belief in gender equality—did not start until after the abuse had already begun.
CGRS Database Case #8747 (2003). As mentioned below, the applicant appealed and, in
June 2009, the Board remanded the case to the IJ in light of R-A-. The IJ recertified his
2003 denial and the case is again pending before the Board.
92. Groups accepted during this period included:
 Mexican women who hold beliefs contrary to established social norms; women who
seek to divorce their abusive spouses; women who seek protection from the
government from their abusive spouses; and female member of her own family,
headed by a man whose goal is to control and dominate its members. CGRS
Database Case #222 (2002).
 Ivorian Muslim women who have suffered spousal abuse at the hands of their
husbands and who are perceived as having disgraced their husbands by obtaining
a divorce and failing to conform to the subservient role of women in the Ivory
Coast. CGRS Database Case #614.
 Women in Guatemalan society who resist male domination by living independently
and self-sufficiently. CGRS Database Case #813 (2003).
 Women in Peru who try to escape domestic violence, but are unable to receive
official protection. CGRS Database Case #2572 (2004).
 Women suffering domestic violence in Costa Rica who have chosen to resist that
violence by various means, including resort to government protection. CGRS
Database Case #2528 (2003).
 Honduran women who believe that marriage is an equal partnership, and whose
husbands are Honduran men who believe they have a right to dominate their
wives through any means, including violence. CGRS Database Case #1204
(2003).
 Husband’s immediate family, and Guatemalan women who have been intimately
involved with Guatemalan male companions who believe that women are to live
under male domination. CGRS Database Case #1193 (2003).
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DOJ proposed regulations, the Board’s opinions in Kasinga and Acosta,
and other precedent from the Courts of Appeals, including Fatin, to
recognize groups defined by gender, nationality, family membership,
and/or opposition to a social practice or beliefs about women’s role in
society.93 At least one IJ reversed course from her previous position in
domestic violence cases to grant asylum.94 While R-A- was in effect, the IJ
had denied asylum to a Mexican woman fleeing domestic violence for
failure to demonstrate nexus to a protected ground (though the IJ had
granted CAT relief given the likelihood of severe harm without State
protection). The applicant appealed the denial of asylum. After R-A- was
vacated, the Board remanded the case and, in 2003, the IJ granted asylum
to the applicant on grounds of DV-PSG.
In two cases, judges granted asylum on religious grounds without
considering the applicants’ PSG arguments.95 Both cases involved women
from Muslim countries, Uganda and Indonesia, whose partners held
fundamentalist beliefs regarding the role of women. The IJs analogized
their decisions to the Board’s opinion in Matter of S-A, where the Board
found religious persecution in the context of a father/daughter family
relationship.
In addition, some IJs found that the record supported feminist PO as a
ground for asylum.96 The judges found that the applicants demonstrated
their political opinion against male dominance through their actions—
engaging in physical resistance of abuse, filing for protective orders, and
seeking help—and that the motive of the persecutor was established by the
fact that the abuse escalated after a woman asserted such resistance.97

 Women in Mexico, and women who try to escape domestic violence, but are unable
to receive official protection in Mexico. CGRS Database Case #1194 (2002).
Immediate family members of the applicant’s abuser. CGRS Database Case #2700
(2003).
93. Other precedent included Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing gender defined social group, “gay men with female sexual identities in
Mexico” as cognizable), Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (defining a
PSG as “a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some
common impulse or interest” and recognizing family defined PSG), and Chen v. INS, 289
F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a nuclear family is a “prototypical example”
of a PSG). See also CGRS Database Cases #813 (2003); #222 (2002); #614 (2001); #2700
(2003); #990 (2002); #1043 (2001).
94. CGRS Database Case #313 (2003).
95. CGRS Database Cases #792 (2001); #789 (2002).
96. CGRS Database Cases #1043 (2001); #222 (2002).
97. Such actions, one IJ explained, are “counter to cultural traditions of male dominance
and third-party non-involvement in the personal affairs of couples.” This IJ also concluded
that legislation attempting to address domestic violence in Costa Rica did not render the
applicant ineligible for asylum. Rather, the IJ considered the legislation as evidence in
support of the existence of the applicant’s political opinion. By taking advantage of the
protective measures theoretically available to DV victims under the law, the IJ reasoned that
she had asserted her support for such measures recognizing women as equals. CGRS
Database Case #2528 (2003); see also CGRS Database Cases #222 (2002); #195 (2002).
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This period highlights the disparities in outcomes in cases presenting
very similar facts and legal theories where no guidance is available. While
some judges accepted social groups defined in part by domestic violence or
characteristics of the persecutor relying on precedent from gender-related
cases, other IJs rejected the same, relying on precedent that had been
vacated such as R-A- that was issued prior to enactment of the Refugee Act
such as Pierre, or that included harmful dicta such as Gomez.
c. BIA
The Board recognized the viability of domestic violence asylum cases
in an unpublished opinion on file with CGRS during this period.98 In that
case, the BIA overturned an IJ’s adverse credibility finding, determining
that the judge could not fault the applicant for failing to raise domestic
violence in her initial application filed in 1993, as domestic violence was
not recognized as a basis for asylum at the time. The Board ultimately
granted asylum on a ground unrelated to domestic violence,99 but its
analysis seems to suggest that applicants can (and should) raise domestic
violence as a basis for relief. The importance of this decision is limited,
however, given that it was not published.
4. February 20, 2004 – September 25, 2008: CGRS database case
outcomes after DHS announced its position in DV asylum cases in
Matter of R-AAfter DHS submitted its 2004 brief in R-A-, the CGRS database
recorded increasing numbers of case outcomes: sixteen denials and fortythree grants of relief (thirty-nine asylum and four withholding).100 CGRS
also observed cases where IJs administratively closed or continued
domestic violence asylum cases during this period pending the issuance of
regulations or a precedential decision in R-A-.101
a. Denials
Interestingly, some of the IJs who denied relief during this period
recognized social groups similar to that advanced by DHS in R-A- as a
basis for asylum (though not always citing to DHS’s brief), but denied the
claims on other grounds.102 One judge moved from a categorical rejection

98. CGRS Database Case #1289 (2003).
99. The applicant had also raised an antigovernment political opinion claim for relief.
100. Written decisions were on file for thirty-three of the cases.
101. Frydman, Recent Developments, supra note 34, at 9.
102. For example, one IJ found that a PSG based on gender, nationality and status in the
relationship, “Salvadorian women in intimate relationships who cannot leave the
relationship,” was cognizable. But the IJ determined that the applicant was not a member of
the group because the applicant only lived with her partner for about three months and
“[h]er alleged relationship with him does not appear to have the same characteristics of a
marriage, which would under other circumstances have been an immutable characteristic
because of cultural and societal constraints.” CGRS Database Case #2918 (2007). Other
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of domestic violence asylum claims in 2003, when he held that domestic
violence is a private matter and is not “entitled to international
protection,”103 to a basic recognition in 2008 that the group “married
Mexican women who resist their abusers but are unable to leave their
husbands” might be cognizable.104 This trend represented a shift from
previous periods in which denials depended almost entirely on a failure to
recognize domestic violence asylum as a more general matter.
Other judges continued to reject domestic violence-related social
groups, at times ignoring the DHS position in R-A-, and at others
misinterpreting the position.105 For example, in one case the judge held
that the proffered social group, “married or previously married women in
Croatia who are unable to leave the relationship,” was not cognizable
because it did not exist independently of the persecution.106 The IJ refused
to consider as relevant the DHS brief in R-A-, stating that “[t]he brief has
not been adopted by any agency as authoritative and the Court will not use
it now to support a finding that [the applicant] has established membership
in a particular social group.”107
In another case, the IJ held that the PSG “married Haitian women
unable to leave the relationship” was not cognizable because it did not
share a common immutable characteristic given that Haitian women could
“divorce with relative ease.”108 The IJ erroneously cited to the DHS brief
in R-A- for this holding, failing to grapple with the agency’s statement in its

judges denied for failure to demonstrate membership in the group or failure to show
government inability or unwillingness to protect. See CGRS Database Cases #2953 (2004),
#4087 (2007), #4802 (2008).
103. CGRS Database Case #1290 (2003).
104. Although the IJ stated that he did not need to reach the question of the validity of the
applicant’s asserted social group in the 2008 decision, denying on other grounds, the judge’s
analysis shows at least some progress from his previous position rejecting DV claims
categorically. CGRS Database Case #5513 (2008).
105. The following PSGs were also rejected during this period:
 Women who refuse to acquiesce to sex in a domestic relationship. CGRS Database
Case #2957 (2005).
 Women in Nicaragua; and women who are victims of abuse both in society at large
and within the home. CGRS Database Case #4231 (2005).
 Domestic partners/common-law wives in Guatemala who are unable to leave the
relationship. CGRS Database Case #8002 (2007).
 Battered/abused women. CGRS Database Cases #3040 (2006); #3837 (2005).
106. CGRS Database Case #3688 (2006). The applicant appealed, and the Board
remanded the case. At the time of writing, the case was pending trial.
107. In any event, the judge found that the arguments made in the R-A- brief were
inapplicable because the applicant in the case at hand obtained a divorce. The IJ also held
that the applicant failed to show the government was unable or unwilling to protect her in
part because the government had prosecuted her husband for the rape and murder of another
woman. Id.; see also CGRS Database Case #2957 (2005) (the IJ did not consider the
applicant’s PSG arguments, and with respect to the political opinion arguments, held that
“no Court has found that a refusal to acquiesce in sexual relationships is a political opinion,”
without looking to R-A-).
108. CGRS Database Case #3029 (2006).
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brief that, even if a woman obtains a divorce, her relationship may still be
immutable “if the abuser would not recognize a divorce or separation as
ending the abuser’s right to abuse the victim.”109 Another IJ held that while
“[i]t is clear that DV is a very significant problem in the [applicant’s home
country], . . . it does not appear that the respondent’s boyfriend harmed her
on account of her attempts to leave him or on account of any other
characteristic . . . other than the fact that she was female and his
girlfriend.”110 In other words, the judge found that the applicant’s gender
and status in the relationship, precisely two of the characteristics that
defined the proffered social group, provided the motive for the persecution,
but still inexplicably concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate
nexus to a protected ground.111
One case in particular highlighted the refusal of some judges to
interpret legal developments in favor of applicants. There, the judge held
that “[t]he law today regarding gender and domestic violence based asylum
remains unclear, thus, this Court is unwilling to recognize ‘domestic
partners/common-law wives in Guatemala who are unable to leave the
relationship’ as a social group presently cognizable under the Act.”112
Notably, DHS took a position in that case inconsistent with its position in
R-A-, arguing that the applicant failed to set forth a cognizable social group
or establish nexus, even though the proffered group was virtually identical
to the group recognized by DHS in its 2004 brief. Judges who were
reticent to recognize DV-PSG claims as a basis for asylum, however,
seemed to have no trouble granting domestic violence claims based on
religion involving women who resisted Islamic traditions relying on Matter
of S-A-.113
b. Grants
Grants during this period were based on DV-PSG (twenty-eight cases),
DV-PSG +PO (four), and DV-PO (two). Many judges who granted relief
followed the DHS framework, although some did so with confusion. Other
IJs granted relief without following the framework at all.

109. DHS R-A- Br., supra note 28, at 28.
110. CGRS Database Case #4201 (2005).
111. Another opinion provides even more incomprehensible reasoning for denying relief.
The IJ stated: “there was little or no evidence demonstrating that that [sic] what the situation
is, but accepting that this is what the respondent and her spouse have testified to, the fact is
that the lack of a nexus to any of the, any of the factors which could be relied upon with
evidence, or otherwise, is quite dispositive, the respondent’s case failing from an evidentiary
standpoint.” CGRS Database Case #3377 (2005).
112. CGRS Database Case #8002 (2007).
113. Compare CGRS Database Case #4630 (2007) (granting on religious grounds), with
CGRS Database Case #3837 (denying on PSG grounds) (2005). Compare CGRS Database
Case #416 (2002) (granting on religious grounds), with CGRS Database Case #1074 (2004)
(denying on PSG grounds).
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Most of the groups that were approved during this period followed the
R-A- approach and included gender, nationality, and relationship status as
immutable/fundamental characteristics that define the group.114 In addition
to the guidance provided by DHS’s R-A- brief, IJs granting relief also relied
on related precedent from the Board and the Courts of Appeals recognizing
groups defined by gender in different circumstances, including Kasinga,
Acosta, Fatin, Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, recognizing groups defined by
gender, there “gay men with female sexual identities” in the country of
origin,115 and Mohammed v. Gonzales, recognizing group defined by
gender, there females of a certain clan.116 At least one IJ reversed course
from his previous position of rejecting domestic violence asylum claims.117

114. The following groups were deemed cognizable:
 Married women in [country X] who are unable to leave the relationship. CGRS
Database Cases #3408 (2006) (Guatemala); #3474 (2006) (Peru); #3587 (2006)
(Mongolia).
 Women in Peru who are unable to leave their intimate relationships. CGRS Database
Case #3033 (2005).
 Women in Cambodia who have been raped and abused domestically and whose
governments are unable or unwilling to protect them. CGRS Database Case #641
(2004).
 Married or formerly married Chinese (Christian) women in Indonesia who are unable
to avail themselves of the protection of Indonesian law. CGRS Database Case
#3186 (2005).
 Women in Mexico who are married to abusive husbands, are opposed to such
treatment and are unable to leave the relationship. CGRS Database Case #4133
(2005).
 Honduran women who are abused by their spouses, who think of them as property,
and who are unable to leave the relationship. CGRS Database Case #2532 (2006).
 Honduran women who are abused by their spouses, who think of the women as their
property, and who are unable to leave the relationship. CGRS Database Case
#2532 (2006).
 Honduran women who have been in an intimate relationship with a man who believes
in imposing domination over women by force. CGRS Database Case #4081
(2007).
 Honduran women unable to leave their husbands who exercise domination over their
lives. CGRS Database Case #5477 (2008).
 Married women in a culture that implicitly condones violence against women. CGRS
Database Case #2978 (2008).
 Mexican women unable to leave an abusive (marital) partnership due to familial
relationship. CGRS Database Case #5145 (2008).
In addition, judges granted relief based on religion (three cases), FGC (five), and non-DV
political opinion (one); however, CGRS does not have written opinions on file so it was not
possible to understand why or how the IJs disposed of the DV arguments advanced by the
applicants, so they will not be discussed in detail. See CGRS Database Cases #2625 (2004)
(FGC); #2857 (2004) (FGC); #4031 (2006) (FGC); #3163 (2007) (FGC); #5338 (2008)
(FGC); #3773 (2006) (religion); #4630 (2007) (religion); #4673 (2007) (religion); #4200
(2005) (political opinion).
115. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
116. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005).
117. Compare CGRS Database Case #1271 (2002), with CGRS Database Cases #2487
(2004) (granting relief on joint remand from the Board), #3064 (2005) (giving “considerable
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Another judge, who had granted asylum in a domestic violence case before
DHS filed its 2004 brief on the basis of a family-defined social group,
changed her analysis during this period to focus on the DHS formulation.118
IJs who followed R-A-, however, did not escape confusion. For
example, one judge explicitly recognized in his opinion that a social group
“must exist independently of the persecution suffered by the applicant for
asylum” and that under existing case law, gender and “domestic status”
may constitute immutable characteristics that define a group in a domestic
violence case.119 Nevertheless, in the concluding paragraph of his opinion,
the IJ stated that the applicant should be granted asylum as a member of a
PSG comprised of “women who suffer domestic violence,” rather than a
group, as outlined elsewhere in the opinion, defined by gender, nationality,
and status in the relationship. DHS appealed the grant, arguing that “[t]he
respondent and the IJ essentially defined the group by the harm that the
respondent fears,” and that “domestic violence victims” do not constitute a
cognizable social group. The case was still pending at the time of
writing.120
Not all judges who granted relief, however, followed R-A-. In one
case, the DHS attorney argued that the law related to domestic violence
asylum is “in flux,” and that the applicant’s claim under the CAT was
“much stronger” than under asylum law.121 The IJ declined to follow the
DHS attorney’s argument in that case and also declined to follow the
agency’s position in R-A-. Relying on precedent recognizing familydefined groups, the IJ concluded that the DV context should be treated no
differently from other instances when family members are targeted for
persecution; the fact that the persecution came from within the family
rather than without did not change the analysis. In other cases, IJs
recognized groups that, unlike the group proffered by DHS in R-A-,
included a reference to the abuse experienced in the relationship.122 While
the outcomes were ultimately positive for the applicants in those cases at

deference” to the DHS position in the R-A- brief), and #5369 (2008) (recognizing that the
definition of the particular social group term has expanded).
118. Compare CGRS Database Case #881 (2002), with #3825 (2007).
119. CGRS Database Case #5256 (2008).
120. CGRS filed an amicus brief to the Board in this case urging the Board to reformulate
the PSG and affirm the IJ’s grant without remand. Under well-settled law, the brief argues
that the BIA reviews de novo the formulation of PSGs and may affirm the grant of asylum
on the basis of a formulation that varies from the group articulated by the IJ. Once the
Board articulates a cognizable group, it may conclude without remand that the applicant is a
member of that group because all of the facts necessary for making that determination are in
the record and undisputed and the applicant properly raised the PSG issue. CGRS Database
Case #5256 (CGRS Br. 2011).
121. CGRS Database Case #4133 (2005).
122. See CGRS Database Case #641 (2004) (finding that the past abuse the applicant
suffered in her domestic relationship was a “shared past experience,” that is now
immutable).
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the level of the immigration court, the social groups may have been
untenable at the appellate level (if DHS contested the grant), because the
groups recognized by the IJs were in tension with precedent requiring that
PSGs exist independent of persecution.123 It is unclear from the CGRS
database whether the IJs in those cases were aware of the DHS position in
R-A-. In any event, these cases highlight the marked absence of uniform
guidance.
c. BIA
The database included only one decision from the Board during this
period.124 Relying on Kasinga, the Board reversed the IJ’s denial of relief
and granted asylum based on the applicant’s well-founded fear of female
genital cutting. The Board did not address the applicant’s claim based on
domestic violence other than the threat of genital cutting.
5. September 26, 2008 – July 16, 2009: CGRS database case
outcomes decided after the U.S. Attorney General lifted the stay in
Matter of R-AThe CGRS database recorded only two denials, one at the IJ level and
one at the Board, and only one new grant of relief during this period. The
CGRS database also included some IJ orders to administratively close or
continue domestic violence cases pending guidance as well as some BIA
orders remanding cases to the immigration courts.
a. Denial
The immigration judge who denied relief during this period held that
the applicant’s proffered social group was not cognizable.125 Although the
judge recognized that the group was defined by gender, an immutable
characteristic, the IJ determined that the group, “Zimbabwean women who
assert their independence from domineering and abusive male partners,
including former spouses” lacked “social visibility” and “particularity.”
The IJ did not cite to the proposed regulations or any of the documents
associated with the developments in Matter of R-A-.
b. Grant
One applicant was granted asylum during this period on the basis of her
membership in a PSG.126 CGRS did not have the opinion on file, so the
precise contours of the group accepted by the IJ were unknown. DHS
waived appeal.

123. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003).
124. CGRS Database Case #927 (2004).
125. The IJ also found that the applicant failed to provide sufficient corroboration of her
claim. CGRS Database Case #5807 (2008).
126. CGRS Database Case #5922 (2009).
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c. BIA
In an unpublished opinion, the Board rejected a social group defined by
gender, nationality, and status in the relationship on grounds that “such a
group lacks the elements of ‘social visibility’ and ‘particularity’ . . ., and
because membership in such a group is not a ‘fundamental’ or immutable
characteristic.”127 In so doing, as argued by the attorney in the case on
appeal, the BIA appears to have treated this case differently from the
broader class of domestic violence cases remanded to IJs for additional fact
gathering after AG Mukasey lifted the stay during this and the following
period.128 Moreover, the Board’s reasoning was significant in that it
rejected the claim in part for failure of the proffered group to meet the
immutable/fundamental PSG test rather than for the reasons the Board
rejected Ms. Alvarado’s claim discussed above,129 or for other resistance to
domestic violence asylum on the basis that domestic violence is personal
and undeserving of protection as a categorical matter.
6. July 16, 2009 – December 10, 2009: CGRS database case
outcomes after DHS clarified its position in Matter of L-Rregarding the viability of DV asylum
In the six months after the DHS brief in L-R- became public, the CGRS
database recorded five denials and seven grants (six asylum and one
CAT).130
a. Denials
IJs who denied relief during this period did so as a result of a
misunderstanding of the status of R-A- and other related developments as
well as a lack of guidance on how to treat domestic violence asylum cases.
Of the denials, one decision especially demonstrates the confusion
regarding the social group analytical framework for domestic violence
cases. The judge, even while recognizing that R-A- had been vacated, still
relied on the analysis in the R-A- decision to support his reasoning that the
group, “wom[e]n who have suffered severe domestic abuse at the hands of

127. The Board cited other reasons for denial, including credibility and insufficient
evidence to show real or imputed political opinion as a basis for the persecution. CGRS
Database Case #6655 (2009).
128. Notably, the government initially took the position that only in the context of a
formal marriage could a particular social group exist in a DV case. However, the
government later switched its position and joined the applicant in a motion to remand to the
IJ, which the Board granted.
129. In R-A-, the Board held that even if the PSG was joined by immutable or fundamental
characteristics in line with Acosta, the group was not “recognized and understood to be a
societal faction.”
130. The database includes three written opinions for the denials, but it did not produce
any written decisions for the grants during this period.
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a known drug trafficker,” was not sufficiently “particular” or “visible.”131
The judge also found that, even if the PSG is cognizable, the applicant
failed to demonstrate nexus because her persecutor only harmed her
because he believed that “she is a woman whom . . . ‘belonged’ to him.”
The IJ failed to explain how a man’s belief that a woman “belongs” to him
is anything other than persecution on account of that women’s gender and
status in a domestic relationship, precisely what DHS argued is sufficient to
show eligibility for asylum in L-R- and R-A-.132
In another case on remand from the Board, the IJ reinstated his
previous order denying relief.133 Although the applicant submitted DHS’s
briefs from L-R- and R-A- to the court and DHS did not contest the
existence of a PSG in that case,134 the judge made no mention of these
intervening developments. Rather, the IJ concluded that even if the
applicant were a member of a cognizable PSG, “she has not established a
nexus between her membership in that group, and the mistreatment she
received at the hands of her husband. Neither party has cited to any
controlling court decisions that articulate this nexus has been established in
similar cases.”135
Another opinion issued during this period further evinces the continued
resistance to domestic violence claims for asylum. In that case, the judge
found that the applicant was credible, but then also found that she had not
established a nexus between the harm she suffered and her membership in a
PSG, defined as “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave
their relationship,” but rather that her abuser “was simply a horrible
131. The case involved horrific facts; the applicant was kidnapped at age twenty-one, gang
raped repeatedly over the course of several days, and then forced into a relationship with
one of her rapists as a result of threats to kill her family. CGRS Database Case #3353
(2009).
132. The Board also denied relief in another case during this period that presents
somewhat different factual circumstances. There, a woman was tricked into marrying a man
who forced her into prostitution. In an unpublished opinion, the Board found there was no
nexus because the persecutor mistreated and threatened the applicant not on account of any
protected ground, but rather because she refused to engage in and exposed his criminal
activities. Moreover, the Board rejected the social group, “Mongolian women who are
forced or sold into prostitution,” finding that the PSG lacked social visibility and
particularity. The Board did not discuss the relationship between the applicant and her
husband and it does not appear that the relationship was argued by the applicant as a
defining characteristic. CGRS Database Case #6473 (2009). In the other case from this
period, an IJ denied relief based on an adverse credibility determination, but did not engage
in a PSG or PO analysis. CGRS Database Case #6503 (2009).
133. The IJ denied relief in 2003 and the applicant appealed. The case was held in
abeyance for several years. In 2009, the Board remanded the case in light of the AG’s order
lifting the stay in Matter of R-A- for “further factual development, including the submission
of new evidence, and for the parties to present argument regarding applicable asylum law to
those facts, and for the entry of a new decision by the [IJ].” CGRS Database Case #8747
(2009).
134. The DHS in that case argued against a grant of relief by distinguishing the facts from
that of Ms. Alvarado’s case.
135. CGRS Database Case #8747 (2009).
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husband who lacked a basic sense of morality” and that she was just a
“victim of crime which was perpetrated without reason.”136 This case is
currently pending before the Board.
b. Grants
Most of the grants during this period were based on DV-PSG (four
cases). The other grants were based on FGC-PSG (one case) and religion
(one).137 The grants based on PSG followed, at least in part, the groups
approved by DHS, such as “married women in Nicaragua who are unable
to leave the relationship.”138 As before, however, not all IJs who granted
relief accepted the government’s L-R-/R-A- formulation. For example, in
one case, the judge rejected the applicant’s proffered groups, including
“Cameroonian women who are viewed as property within domestic
relationships by virtue of their gender” and “Cameroonian women who
have been forced into marriage.” The judge expressed concern that the
former was circular, and that the latter did not accurately describe the
applicant’s experience because her relationship was more akin to “sex
slavery” than marriage, which the judge considered to be “worse.”139 In the
end, the IJ determined that the applicant “must” fall within some
cognizable PSG, based on the abhorrent treatment she suffered, but he
granted relief without explicitly defining the group.
An IJ granted CAT relief in another case, but denied asylum and
withholding, rejecting the group, “Honduran women who are unable to
leave a relationship with the fathers of their children.”140 Without referring
to any of the developments in R-A- or L-R-, the IJ found that the group
lacked “particularity” and “social visibility” and that the applicant’s status
in the relationship was not immutable because she “did eventually leave
[her abuser]” to flee to the United States, which “terminat[ed] the
relationship.” In the alternative, the judge held that the applicant failed to
establish nexus: “She was not abused because she was unable to leave the
relationship. Rather, she was unable to leave the relationship because she

136. CGRS Database Case #8767 (2009).
137. CGRS Database Cases #6392 (2009) (religion); #6463 (2009) (FGC). In the case
where the grant rested on past FGC alone, the applicant suffered severe domestic violence
as well, but the DV was not the basis for the IJ’s reasoning. It is not clear whether the IJ
considered the DV-PSG arguments, or rather considered them extraneous because the grant
based on FGC was sufficient and held more analytical clarity under Kasinga.
138. CGRS Database Case #6178 (2009). In addition, the following PSGs were deemed
cognizable:
 Guatemalan women in an intimate relationship who have been subjected to violence
and who assert through their actions their right to be free of violence. CGRS
Database Case #5146 (2009).
 Guatemalan women in intimate relationships with police officers who have been
subjected to violence. CGRS Database Case #5146 (2009).
139. CGRS Database Case #6519 (2009).
140. CGRS Database Case #6649 (2009).
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was being abused. It appears that the abuse suffered by Respondent,
although tragic, was the result of [her abuser’s] efforts to exert power and
control over her, not her membership in any particular social group.”
7. Post-December 11, 2009: CGRS database case outcomes decided
after the IJ granted asylum to Matter of R-A- on remand from the
Board
Since the IJ’s decision granting asylum to Ms. Alvarado,141 as of May
17, 2012, the CGRS database recorded fifty-eight case outcomes, including
forty grants of asylum or withholding, two grants of CAT relief, and
thirteen denials. The database also recorded three grants of motions to
reopen to allow women the opportunity to apply for relief in domestic
violence cases.142
a. Denials
In cases denying relief since R-A-, some judges have accepted the DHS
social group framework, but denied asylum or withholding because of the
applicant’s failure to satisfy the other eligibility criteria such as establishing
membership in the group.143 At the same time, however, many judges have
rejected DHS’s approach, expressing skepticism regarding the viability of
domestic violence as a basis for asylum under any circumstances.144 Some
judges have also denied relief with no reference to developments in the LR- and R-A- cases.145 Other judges have referred to the L-R- and/or R-A-

141. The most recent decision analyzed for this article was issued on May 17, 2012. Since
then, CGRS has continued to receive information about outcomes in DV cases on a regular
basis.
142. Written opinions were on file for twenty-six of the cases.
143. CGRS Database Cases #7436 (2010) (recognizing group defined by gender,
nationality and status in the relationship, but finding that applicant was not a member of the
group because she did not live with her abuser); #8644 (2011) (recognizing group defined
by gender, nationality and status in an abusive relationship, but finding that the applicant
was not a member of the group because she did not try to leave the relationship prior to
leaving the country).
144. CGRS Database Cases #3110 (2010) (denying relief reasoning that all countries are
“not as good” as the United States’ on women’s rights, but “that doesn’t mean that the
United States should grant asylum to all women of the world”); #6550 (2010) (denying
relief again on remand, concluding that nothing had changed since R-A- and continuing to
refuse to recognize PSG asylum in the DV context); #8282 (2012) (rejecting group,
“Honduran women unable to leave a domestic relationship,” and denying relief in part based
on conclusion that “[h]arm resulting from a social problem” does not constitute harm
because of an enumerated ground).
145. The following DV-PSGs were among those rejected during this period:
 Indian women in a domestic relationship and unable to free themselves from their
partners and viewed as property by nature of their position in a domestic
relationship. CGRS Database Case #7607 (2011).
 Kenyan women in a domestic relationship who are unable to leave. CGRS Database
Case #8491 (2011).
 Married women in Mongolia who cannot leave marriage. CGRS Database Case
#6626 (2010).
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developments, but nevertheless concluded that groups defined by gender,
nationality, and status in the relationship lack the requisite social visibility
and particularity.146 One judge, for example, found that while relationship
status can be immutable, because the plight of women is generally ignored
by the society, the applicant’s group lacked visibility.147 Similarly, a judge
rejected the L-R- social group formulations, finding that the group is not
visible in India because only thirty percent of domestic violence victims
there seek assistance.148 The IJ’s nexus analysis in that case further
demonstrates a deep misunderstanding of the context and motivations of
abusers in the domestic sphere. There, the applicant argued that her partner
“attempted to control [her] sexual and reproductive rights by raping her and
causing a miscarriage” on account of her group membership. The IJ found
that the applicant failed to demonstrate nexus, reasoning that “there is
nothing to indicate that the miscarriage occurred on account of [the
applicant’s] membership in a particular social group as opposed to
dissatisfaction with the unpaid dowry, [the persecutor’s] poor character, or
another unwanted mouth to feed similar to [the applicant’s son],” and “it
would appear that the alleged rape was part of [the persecutor’s] alleged
attempt to force [the applicant’s] family into giving him custody of his
son.”149 Another IJ found that the group “married women in Guatemala
who are unable to leave the relationship” is impermissibly circular.150
Some judges have expressed a desire to provide protection for
applicants in domestic violence cases but conclude that the current state of
the law constrains them.151 One judge rejected the L-R- social group
formulations as circular, but stated that if he were writing on a blank slate,
he would find women in the particular country to be a cognizable group.
The judge claimed that he could not do so in that case, because he had been
 Women in abusive relationships in El Salvador who escape the country in order to
flee their abuser. CGRS Database Case #8644 (2011).
 Salvadoran women unable to leave domestic relationship. CGRS Database Case
#6667 (2011).
In addition to PSG, denials during this period have also been based on no political opinion
(3 occurrences), no nexus (3), changed country conditions (1), and credibility (2).
146. CGRS Database Cases #6626 (2010) (rejecting “married women in Mongolia who
cannot leave the marriage”); #7186 (2010).
147. CGRS Database Case #8491 (2011).
148. CGRS Database Case #7607 (2011).
149. Id.
150. This IJ also found that even if the PSG was cognizable, the applicant had not
established she was a member of the group because, contrary to DHS’s position in R-A-, she
could not show that she was unable to leave, reasoning that she had left three times before,
including her flight to the United States, despite her husband’s refusal to divorce her.
CGRS Database Case #7186 (2010).
151. See CGRS Database Case #7186 (2010) (“Although the respondent presents a
sympathetic case for expansion of current law regarding asylum, the Court holds that, based
upon the facts in this case, the prevailing law in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals does
not recognize as a basis for asylum the respondent’s claim based upon domestic abuse by a
spouse or former spouse in the respondent’s country of origin.”).
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rebuffed by the Board in other cases where he had taken the gender plus
nationality approach. As such, the IJ stated that he would continue to deny
relief in the current state of the law cases until further guidance came back
from the Board.152 In another case, the IJ rejected a gender-defined group
in a DV case, but explicitly urged the attorney to appeal the decision,
hoping that it would result in a precedential decision from the Board.153
The judge indicated that he was sympathetic towards the plight of the
applicant, but stated that he “did not believe the action of one man on his
own” equated to persecution deserving of asylum protection.154
b. Grants
Despite lingering resistance, it is clear that the developments in R-Aand L-R- have made a significant impact on decision-making in domestic
violence asylum cases across the country. In many cases, judges have
accepted the DHS framework and recognized groups that include some
combination of the L-R- characteristics of gender, nationality, and status in
the relationship, and have moved away from groups defined by the
persecution suffered.155 The majority of the asylum and withholding grants
during this period were based on DV-PSG (thirty-six out of the forty). The
remaining cases were based on DV-PSG + DV-PO (two cases). Of
considerable importance, the CGRS database contains a grant of asylum in
a case that advanced DV-PSG as the basis for asylum before an IJ in the
Eloy, Arizona immigration court.156 This is believed to be the first ever

152. CGRS Database Case #6667 (2011).
153. The case is still pending. CGRS Database Case #8541 (2012).
154. Id.
155. The following PSGs were accepted during this period:
 Women in [country X] who are unable to leave a domestic relationship. CGRS
Database Cases #8683 (2012); #8370 (2012); #8203 (2012); #7571 (2012); #7548
(2011); 6269 (2011); #8054 (2011); #7668 (2011); #6291 (2010); #5562 (2011);
#6161 (2010); #6127 (2010); #7074 (2010); #6748 (2010).
 Women in [country X] in domestic relationships who are viewed as property by
virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship. CGRS Database Cases
#7661 (2011); #6161 (2010); #7484 (2011); #7668 (2011); #6748 (2010); #8054
(2011).
 Nicaraguan women whose domestic partners view them as property and refuse to let
them leave the relationship. CGRS Case #6142 (2010).
 Married Guatemalan women and/or women who are in a domestic relationship who
resist their abusers but are unable to leave the relationship. CGRS Database Case
#7520 (2011).
 Women in Honduras who are in a domestic relationship with a police officer. CGRS
Database Case #8517 (2012).
 Female members of the Bulu tribe who oppose polygamy. CGRS Database Case
#5204.
 Family relationship. CGRS Database Case #5326 (2010).
156. CGRS Database Case #6394 (2010).
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domestic violence case granted in that jurisdiction, which had heretofore
been particularly resistant to these cases.157
Nevertheless, there are still some judges who have granted relief on
rationales independent from the DHS approach. In one case, for example,
the applicant and DHS stipulated to the L-R- “unable to leave” and “viewed
as property” formulations of the social group. However, to grant relief the
judge reformulated the group based on gender, nationality, and the
applicant’s shared experiences of having been used as sex slave in Liberia,
having borne children as a result of rape, and having escaped from
enslavement.158 One IJ has been willing to grant CAT relief in domestic
violence cases, but has denied asylum or withholding, rejecting social
groups proffered by applicants who follow the R-A-/L-R- framework. The
IJ has rejected DV-PSGs with little analysis, simply stating in one case that
the group was not cognizable because the Board’s R-A- decision was
vacated and there was no binding precedent from the Board or the Court of
Appeals,159 and stating in another case that “the particular social group of
which the [applicant] claims to be a member . . . is overly broad and is
undeserving of relief under the INA.”160
c. DHS position
In some cases, DHS trial attorneys have followed the agency’s
approach in L-R- and R-A-, filing joint motions to remand from the Board
and then declining to contest a grant of relief for the applicant.161 In other
cases, DHS attorneys have made arguments to immigration judges and the
Board that are inconsistent with the agency’s position in L-R- and R-A-.162
For example, a DHS attorney in Pennsylvania argued against a grant of
relief in the immigration court, stating that domestic violence can never
give rise to a cognizable PSG for asylum. The IJ in that case rejected the
DHS attorney’s argument and directed the attorney to revisit the agency’s
position set forth in its 2009 brief in L-R-.163 A DHS attorney in Texas
appealed a grant of asylum, contesting the IJ’s holding that the abuse
suffered by the applicant at the hands of her common-law husband was on
account of her membership in a PSG identical to the L-R-/R-A- groups,

157. For example, in another Eloy case, the IJ denied asylum and the applicant appealed.
While the matter was pending before the Board, the attorney and DHS filed a joint motion
stipulating to a grant of asylum and seeking a remand to the IJ on that basis. On remand, the
DHS attorney explained that the agency believed that the applicant was a member of a PSG
and qualified for asylum, but the IJ stated that nothing had changed in the law and denied
the case again. CGRS Database Case #8350 (2012).
158. CGRS Database Case #7535 (2012).
159. CGRS Database Case #8787 (2012). This IJ has granted asylum in DV cases, but
only where based on FGC or relief. See CGRS Database Case #7485 (2012); #6392 (2009).
160. CGRS Database Case #8823 (2012).
161. CGRS Database Case #7758 (2011).
162. CGRS Database Case #7186 (2010).
163. CGRS Database Case #6127 (2010).
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“Honduran women who are unable to leave their domestic relationship.”164
The case is still pending. In another case pending before the BIA,165 the
attorney for the applicant contacted DHS in San Francisco to see if the
agency would consider withdrawing its opposition to the applicant’s appeal
in light of its position in L-R-. The DHS attorney declined withdrawal,
stating that DHS was “not estopped” from taking a position that differs
from the L-R- brief because the brief was filed by a different branch of the
agency.
Although many DHS attorneys have not objected to an applicant’s
submission of the agency’s L-R- and R-A- briefs,166 some have objected,
citing confidentiality concerns.167 For example, in one case, DHS argued
that the L-R- brief attached to an applicant’s motion to reopen had not been
redacted of identifying information and therefore declined to “remark upon
the document further as to do so could constitute a violation of the asylum
confidentiality regulations.”168 DHS attorneys have objected to the
inclusion of the L-R- materials in some cases notwithstanding a letter sent
from Ms. L.R.’s counsel to the agency indicating that Ms. L.R. “authorized
the disclosure” of the redacted briefs and other materials submitted in her
case.169
d. BIA
The Board has had several opportunities to clarify the law of domestic
violence asylum, but it has repeatedly dodged the issue. In an unpublished
decision issued in January 2012, the Board acknowledged that whether
domestic violence may be the basis for an asylum claim “remains

164. CGRS Database Case #7074 (2010).
165. In that case, the IJ initially denied asylum in 2008 on the basis that the applicant had
failed to show the government of Nicaragua was unable or unwilling to protect her, though
the IJ did recognize the proffered social group as cognizable. The applicant had appealed
the unable/unwilling ruling; and the government opposed arguing, among other things, that
even if the unable/unwilling ruling was overturned, the applicant was not a member of a
cognizable social group. CGRS Database Case #4802 (2008).
166. CGRS Database Case #6161 (2010).
167. CGRS Database Case #6731 (2011).
168. CGRS Database Case #6473 (2010).
169. Letter from Karen Musalo, CGRS Director and U.C. Hastings Clinical Professor of
Law, to David A. Martin, Principal Deputy General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel,
DHS (Aug. 9, 2010) (on file with author). The agency responded to this letter, stating that
the letter had been forwarded to leadership within the agency to make sure that DHS
attorneys in field offices understand DHS’s “legal policy and the importance of taking
litigation positions consistent with that legal policy.” Letter from David A. Martin to Karen
Musalo (Sept. 30, 2010) (on file with author). However, in the response letter, DHS also
stated that it “discourage[s]” the submission of briefs in unrelated cases “[b]ecause each
case should be argued on its own merits.” Id. But, it should be noted that the regulations
governing disclosure of information pertaining to an asylum application, like the briefs in RA-and L-R-, do not apply to instances where a U.S. government official “need[s] to examine
information in connection with . . . adjudication of asylum applications.” 8 C.F.R. §
1208.6(c)(1)(i).
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unresolved.”170 Rather than issue a decision setting forth its interpretation
of the statute, the Board determined that even if domestic violence could be
the basis for asylum, the applicant had no well-founded fear, because the
evidence in the case indicated that her abuser was living in the United
States. The Board also granted asylum in a domestic violence case in
which DHS had stipulated to a grant, but it did so in a one-sentence order
with no analysis.171
Significantly, however, the Board granted two motions to reopen
during this period to afford women the opportunity to apply for asylum on
the basis of domestic violence.172 In one case, the Board had previously
denied an applicant’s motion to reopen, holding that there had been no
ineffective assistance of counsel, one of the potential bases for reopening,
where the applicant failed to raise the domestic violence asylum claim
during her court proceedings in 1999 because domestic violence was not
legally viable at that time.173 Then, in 2011, the Board granted the
applicant’s second motion to reopen sua sponte, using its powers to
overcome the time and numerical limitations imposed on such motions.174
The BIA also utilized its sua sponte powers to reopen one other case on file
during this period. There, the applicant had not initially filed for asylum
based on domestic violence because she was in immigration proceedings
with her husband, so she later sought to have her case reopened after her
husband was deported.175
CGRS is aware of several domestic violence asylum cases that, as of
the date of writing, have been fully briefed and are pending before the
Board awaiting decision. In one pending case, the Board sought
supplemental briefing from the parties and amicus curiae briefs to address
“whether domestic violence can, in some instances, form the basis of an
asylum or withholding of removal claim.”176 Although it is possible that a
published decision on domestic violence asylum may be forthcoming from
the BIA in this case, the briefs were filed in 2011, and at the time of

170. CGRS Database Case #8389 (2012).
171. The order stated: “In consideration of the joint motion, as well as the totality of the
circumstances presented in this case, the respondent’s application for asylum … is granted.”
CGRS Database Case #8350 (2012). Although of minimal precedential or persuasive value,
the Board’s decision is significant because it is a grant in a DV case even after the
imposition of the social visibility and particularity requirements.
172. CGRS Database Cases #6778 (2011); #7453 (2011). At least one IJ also granted a
motion to reopen in a DV case as well. CGRS Database Case #7821 (2011).
173. This decision was upheld by the Ninth Circuit. CGRS Database Case #6778 (2011).
174. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), an applicant can only file one motion to reopen and it
must be filed “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision
was rendered in the proceeding sought to be opened.” However, under subsection (a), the
Board retains discretion to “at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in
which it has rendered a decision.”
175. CGRS Database Case #7453 (2011).
176. CGRS Database Case #5256 (2011).
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writing, such a decision had yet to be issued. CGRS is also aware of at
least two other domestic violence cases for which the Board has requested
supplemental briefing from the parties and amici curiae to answer similar
questions.177 The Board also has before it the validity of the social
visibility and particularity requirements, which were recently rejected by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.178 Although the Third Circuit case
does not involve domestic violence or other gender persecution, if the
Board refines its approach to social group analysis, this could affect the
analysis in domestic violence cases. The briefs were submitted in May
2012, but the Board is under no obligation to timely resolve the matter.179

IV. CONCLUSION
There has been some movement towards consistent decision making
since the grants of asylum in Matter of R-A-and Matter of L-R-. However,
the information in the CGRS database demonstrates that the absence of
applicable norms and the shifting policy positions on the part of DHS have
continued to produce contradictory and arbitrary outcomes in domestic
violence asylum cases. Some IJs grant relief in domestic violence cases
following the official DHS approach in R-A- and L-R- or related precedent,
whereas other IJs deny relief based on a refusal to see domestic violence as
anything other than a personal dispute despite external developments in this
area, and still others deny relief by relying on inapplicable or faulty
understanding of precedent. As many women wait in limbo and many
judges remain resistant, the Courts of Appeals have advanced gender-based
social groups in other contexts—for example, in the context of female
genital cutting, forced marriage, and opposition to social mores,
recognizing social groups such as “Somalian females” or “young girls in
the Benadiri clan,”180 “women in China who have been subjected to forced
marriage and involuntary servitude,”181 “women who have escaped
involuntary servitude after being abducted and confined by [a guerrilla
organization],”182 “Christian women in Iran who do not wish to adhere to
the Islamic female dress code,”183 and “women in Jordan who have
(allegedly) flouted repressive moral norms, and thus who face a high risk of
honor killing.”184
But, these decisions have not been sufficient to persuade in many
instances. To put it plainly, whether a woman fleeing domestic violence
177. CGRS Database Cases #8767 (2012); #7186 (2010).
178. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011).
179. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(8).
180. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hassan v. Gonzales,
484 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2007).
181. Bi Xia Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2010).
182. Gomez Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2008).
183. Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2002).
184. Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2011).
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will receive protection in the United States seems to depend not on the
consistent application of objective principles, but rather on the view of her
individual judge, often untethered to any legal principles at all. The U.S.
government has stated that regulations are “being worked on” by DHS and
DOJ.185 If the last twelve years are any indication, little confidence can be
placed in such pronouncements. The United States should adjudicate
domestic violence asylum cases consistent with international norms,
guidance from the United Nations Human Commissioner for Refugees, and
a growing body of jurisprudence in U.S. Federal Courts of Appeals that
readily recognize gender-defined social groups, and clearly establish that
persecution by intimate partners is a basis for asylum.

185. The Regulatory Plan, supra note 8, at 64221 (recognizing that “[t]he failure to
promulgate a final rule in this area presents significant risks of further inconsistency and
confusion in the law. The government’s interests in fair, efficient and consistent
adjudications would be compromised”).

